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Cyprus’s parliament has rejected a proposed agreement to levy €5.8 billion from Cypriot bank
accounts as part of the country’s bailout deal. Sony Kapoor argues that despite the extremely
negative reaction to the proposal, the other options facing Cyprus are no more appealing.
Seeking assistance from Russia through the gas company Gazprom might generate long-term
complications for the country, and the collapse of the Cypriot banking system would have far
more severe consequences than the proposed bank levy.
The Cyprus f iasco has all the hallmarks of  a classic ‘whodunnit’. Someone somewhere took
a decision that now no-one, nowhere, appears to have made – to impose an unprecedented levy on bank
deposit holders in Cyprus. Most commentary on the deal has been terribly negative, sometimes alarmist:
that it will spark of f  bank runs in Spain, or that it rips the shirts of f  the backs of  the poor in Cyprus. There
were some exceptions to this negative coverage, including yours truly.
One school of  thought agreed with the need f or a depositor bail- in, but was uncomf ortable with not
exempting depositors under the €100,000 deposit insurance cap (though technically such a limit is irrelevant
f or the clever levy that has been proposed). I belong to this school and did not crit icise the concept of
bailing- in depositors, having agreed with the IMF that this was both f air and unavoidable in order to make
the numbers add up in the rescue of  Cyprus.
A second school of  thought, much more
widespread than the f irst one, believed that
bailing- in depositors of  any kind was a barmy
idea that would f uel bank runs across the
Eurozone. I believe that the alternative of
sovereign def ault would have been much
worse; it is impossible to imagine a saf e
banking system in a sovereign undergoing
restructuring of  debt. Remember how much
capital Greek banks needed af ter it
def aulted? In f act, Cyprus would probably not
have needed a bailout if  its banks had not
incurred huge losses on holdings of  Greek
debt. Add to this the complication that half  of
Cyprus’s sovereign bonds are under f oreign
(English) law, which makes a successf ul
restructuring of  sovereign debt much harder. Moreover, Cypriot banks hold large swathes of  its sovereign
bonds, so it would be f urther bankrupted by any sovereign restructuring.
A second alternative would have been that the EU and IMF give a f ull €17 billion loan to Cyprus, but this
leads us back to sovereign restructuring, as Cyprus would have ended up with an unsustainable debt
burden. A third option would have seen Cyprus get international aid or transf ers (not loans), at least f or
some of  the amount. This would have worked well f or Cypriots, but it is unclear who should have given this
aid or indeed why they would have done so. The possibility of  a direct recapitalisation of  Cypriot banks by
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), discussed under now-shelved plans f or a banking union, would
also have helped (provided this was done without a sovereign guarantee). But because the banks are
essentially bankrupt and losses have already materialised, it would be highly unlikely that the ESM would
ever get its money back in f ull. This then is again a transf er.
While such explicit or implicit transf ers may be possible and may yet come about af ter yesterday’s rejection
of  the Eurogroup deal by the Cypriot parliament, they will simply not be enough. Given how entrenched the
belief  that much of  Cypriot bank deposits comprise dodgy Russian money is, it is hard to see any EU
leader, particularly Angela Merkel, signing their own polit ical death warrant by being seen to ‘use scarce
taxpayer f unds to bail out Russian money launderers and oligarchs’. In any case, as Charles Goodhart and I
wrote in the Wall Street Journal in January, the Banking Union has become a Sham.
A f ourth option takes the f orm of  an of f er by the Russian gas giant Gazprom (in ef f ect with the backing of
the Russian government) to support the Cypriot banking system (thereby protecting the Russian oligarch
depositors now) in exchange f or rights f or exploration and exploitation of  what seem to be Cyprus’s
promising gas f ields. The history of  Af rica and Latin America is lit tered with extortionary contracts with
f oreign mineral and oil f irms, which take more than their pound of  f lesh of  resource rents having struck
juicy bargains with countries under duress. There is lit t le reason to suspect that this deal would not carry a
steep long-term price f or Cypriots. They may win the battle with the Eurogroup, only to lose the war to the
Russians.
A f if th option, put f orward by Buchheit & Gulati f ocuses primarily on a f orced extension of  maturity of  both
the sovereign debt of  Cyprus as well as bank deposits in excess of  €100,000. This means that it f alls
somewhere between the discussion on bailing- in depositors and the restructuring of  sovereign debt, and
shares the burden of  adjustment between the two. It does not discuss how the presently bankrupt Cypriot
banks would be capitalised, so merely of f ers the possibility of  extending the twilight zone that has existed
in Cyprus since the restructuring of  Greek debt bankrupted its banks. It is hard to see how this twilight zone
could be allowed to continue much longer and in f act the ECB’s threat to veto the continuing f unding of  the
essentially bankrupt Laiki bank was one of  the f actors that f orced the Eurogroup deal through.
So what are we left  with?
First is the issue of  ‘whodunnit’ – our instinct here is that despite the FT’s excellent attempt at
reconstructing what transpired, we will never really f ind out. It was some f orm of  a collective decision trying
to square a circle, but no-one had quite anticipated the almost universal condemnation of  the deal, and the
polit ical earthquake of  universal rejection by the Cypriot parliament. This matters a lot in terms of  the very
real trade-of f s between tackling the Eurocrisis and tackling the democratic def icit, but it is not the f ocus of
this piece.
Second, will this lead to widespread contagion? In my opinion the answer here is no, it will not. Cyprus is a
known tax haven seeded with laundered money and a banking system worth 800 per cent of  its GDP.
Despite being wary of  using clichés, we are f orced to say that Cyprus, in this sense, is truly unique.
Additionally, in all likelihood, any deal that will now be agreed in Cyprus will spare depositors under the
€100,000 threshold. Depositors above that level do not enjoy any state guarantees in any case. Besides
the situation in Spain and Italy is dif f erent enough f or most people to understand that not much has
changed in terms of  how saf e their deposits are, despite the so-called crossing of  the Rubicon in Cyprus.
Third, who should pay? This is probably the hardest call to make. The alternative to the Troika support
package or Gazprom deal is widespread bank f ailure. In such an event, there are large economic deadweight
costs that will impose a burden on all Cypriot taxpayers, depositors and businesses. Given the limits of  its
sovereign f inancing capability, the Cypriot government will be unable to make insured depositors whole, so
almost everyone in Cyprus will be worse of f . This is why a sharing of  the burden between depositors,
taxpayers, as well as bank shareholders and bondholders is both f air and economically ef f icient.
Fourth, what will happen now? Provided a revised plan, with an exemption f or small depositors, had been
passed by the Cypriot parliament, not much would have happened. Contagion to other countries would
have been limited and while depositors both domestic and f oreign (Russian) would have withdrawn some
f unds, the ECB would have plugged the breach. All in all, a more progressive retrospective deposit to equity
swap than the one that was agreed by the Eurogroup would probably have been a f air and economically
ef f icient deal with limited contagion in the rest of  the Eurozone. It is quite possible that even af ter the
f iasco that the Cypriot deal has now become, such a deal may still be agreed.
However, the events of  the last f ew days have probably sealed Cyprus’s f ate as a tax haven/f inancial
centre f or Russians, as they can no longer be relied on to have either the capacity or the polit ical will to
save their banking system. Coming closely on the heels of  Iceland and Ireland – two other countries where
bloated banking systems that were multiples of  GDP proved to be too big to save – the lessons f rom
Cyprus will also have ripple ef f ects on other tax havens/f inancial centres.
The immediate problem Cyprus will f ace now is the prospect of  large scale withdrawals, particularly by
f oreign depositors. Here the Buchheit & Gulati proposal to convert large deposits into term Certif icates of
Deposits (CDs) may have merit. Both capital and liquidity could then be provided by a conversion of  large
deposits into 15 per cent bank equity and 85 per cent CDs. This option, however, would likely annoy the
Russians and may not be polit ically f easible. So the price that Cyprus may have to pay f or partially bailing- in
large depositors may be to lose the rest. The loss of  f unding, which is still likely to be a slow jog rather
than a f ull run, can, at least in theory, be replaced by ECB and market f unding of  what will then be well-
capitalised banks.
The f if th and f inal question is: what does this mean f or the Eurocrisis? Here my thoughts are clear. Even
bef ore the Cyprus f iasco, the Eurocrisis had reached a ‘point of  almost no return’ f rom which only a grand
polit ical bargain can rescue it. My thoughts on the general state of  economic, f inancial, polit ical and social
af f airs in the Eurocrisis, all of  which Cyprus has made even worse, are captured in my recent piece ‘The
EU’s self -def eating approach must end now’. All in all, the Cyprus saga almost surely spells either the
beginning of  the end of  the Eurozone as we know it, or the end of  the beginning (phase I) with a grand
polit ical bargain taking us into the next unknown.
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